In this case the Plaintiff, Lorenzo Hamilton, sued Clarence Howard for damages resulting from being shot by Howard. Hamilton lost in the trial court and appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and sent the case back to the trial court; the Court of Appeals saying the trial judge did not give the jury the proper instructions. But why did Howard shoot Hamilton? The Court of Appeals gives us a summary of the testimony, which you will find interesting. (I do not know what happened when the case was retried.)
234 Ky. 321
Court of Appeals
of Kentucky .
Decided May 13,
1930.
HEAVRIN & MARTIN and GLOVER H. CARY for appellant.
KIRK & BARTLETT for appellee.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUDGE CLAY.
Reversing.
In this action for assault and battery by Lorenzo Hamilton against Clarence Howard the jury found for Howard, and Hamilton appeals.
The petition aptly charges that on December 17, 1927, the defendant wrongfully, intentionally, maliciously, and willfully shot and wounded plaintiff with a pistol, and thereby inflicted on him serious and permanent injury by reason of which he has been damaged in the sum of $10,000. Howard answered in two paragraphs. In the first paragraph he denied certain allegations of the petition. The second paragraph is as follows:
"Pleading further, the defendant says that at the place and at the time mentioned in the petition wherein it is alleged that the defendant shot the plaintiff, as described in the petition the plaintiff assaulted this defendant and was in the act of attacking the defendant, and, as the defendant verily believed, the plaintiff was about to inflict serious bodily injuries to the defendant or probably take defendant's life, and that in acting as the defendant did he did no more than was necessary to protect himself from the assault and the threatened attack by the plaintiff.
"The defendant further states that just before the occasion mentioned and set out in the plaintiff's petition the plaintiff had wrongfully and without right invaded the defendant's home and had made overtures to the defendant's wife, and had sought to ingratiate himself into the affections of defendant's wife and to alienate her affections from this defendant and had suddenly run from defendant's house where he had attempted association with the defendant's wife for the purpose aforesaid, and, as defendant believed, was going to stay nearby in order that he might re-invade the defendant's home for the purpose aforesaid in defendant's absence. Whereupon to preserve the peace and to protect defendant's home from invasion as aforesaid and to protect the defendant's wife from plaintiff's efforts to alienate her affections as aforesaid, the defendant modestly spoke to the plaintiff and requested that he desist such invasion of the defendant's home and such attentions to defendant's wife. Because of which protestations by the defendant, the plaintiff was about to attack the defendant and with great or serious injury to the defendant, when the defendant, to protect himself and in his necessary self-defense as aforesaid and for the purpose of protecting his home and his wife and preventing further invasion of his home as aforesaid fired his pistol and this is the shooting mentioned and referred to in plaintiff's petition."
The facts are these: Howard, who was 26 years of age at the time of the trial, and Hamilton, who was 29, were both married and lived a few miles from
"I had been hauling coal for my brother and got in just a little before sundown and I was coming up the road and I seen my wife get a load of wood and go back in the house and just about that time he come out the same door she went in and he taken up through the woods and orchard circling for E.K. Moseley's, and I went up and got my gun and went toward where he was at, and I walked up and asked him if I hadn't told him to stay away, and talked to him and cried and begged him to stay away, and then I cursed him and told him to stay away, he acknowledged I had, and I told him I had talked every way I could to get him to stay away and I had another remedy I would try to see if that would do.
"Q. Did you tell him you were going to kill him? A. No, sir, I told him I didn't aim to kill him and he need not think it.
"Q. What did he say? A. He didn't say anything.
"Q. I mean when you told him you had asked him to stay away? A. He finally murmured out, after I asked the second time, once.
"Q. Did you ask him on more than one occasion to stay away? A. Several times, more than once.
"Q. But he said `once'? A. Yes, he acknowledged once.
"Q. Then you did shoot him? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. What occurred after that? A. Well, after the shooting occurred, the first thing he said was that he said `Go call the doctor, Lige,' and I started for the doctor, and I asked him if he wanted me to take him in the house and he said yes, and I asked him if he wanted me to take him home and he said no, and I said all right then, and in a minute or so he said yes, you can take me home if you want to and I went down to the house and got the wagon and spring seat and hauled him home."
Mrs. Ethel Howard, a sister-in-law of Clarence Howard, testified that about 5:30 or 6:00 o'clock on the evening of December 17, 1927, as she approached Howard's home, she saw a fellow she took to be Hamilton at the back of the house. E.K. Moseley, who lived about 250 yards from Howard, and on whose premises the shooting occurred, testified that he was at the chip yard engaged in chopping some stove wood when Hamilton came up, and gives the following account of the shooting:
"Yes, sir, he came down the back way and told me not to let the dog bite him, and I told him to come ahead, and he come and set down on a pile of wood and he had been there four or five minutes when I looked up and seen Clarence coming up with his revolver and I never said anything, and he said, `Lo, I caught you this time' and he said I have begged and persuaded you to stay away from my house and I am going to try another plan.
"Q. Did he tell him he had agreed — A. Yes, sir, he said he had begged and cried —
"Q. What did
"Q. He shot him three times? A. He shot three times, reckon he hit him every time."
On cross-examination Moseley stated that
On the other hand,
Over the objection of plaintiff the court instructed the jury as follows:
"I. The court instructs the jury that you should find for the plaintiff and award him in damages such sum as you may believe from the evidence will fairly and reasonably compensate him for any impairment of his power to labor and earn money resulting directly from the shooting and wounding described to you in evidence, and for the pain and suffering which was caused to him by such shooting, unless you believe as set out in Instruction No. II, but if you believe as in Instruction No. II you will find for the defendant.
"II. The defendant had the right to protect his home from intrusion or invasion and if you believe from the evidence that before the occasion on which the plaintiff was shot by defendant, as described to you in evidence, the plaintiff had invaded the defendant's home or had made overtures to the defendant's wife or had sought to ingratiate himself into the affections of defendant's wife or to alienate her affections from the defendant and that the defendant had requested the plaintiff not to go to the defendant's home or to stay away from defendant's home or to desist his attentions to defendant's wife, and if you believe from the evidence plaintiff failed to heed said warnings, if any were given him, and if you believe from the evidence that in shooting and wounding the plaintiff, as described to you in the evidence, the defendant used only such force as was reasonably necessary to prevent the plaintiff from further invading the defendant's home or paying attention to the defendant's wife, then you should find for the defendant.
"III. If you find for the plaintiff you may award him such sum by compensatory damages as you may believe from the evidence will compensate him for any physical or mental suffering which he endured, or for any impairment of his power to earn money as you may believe would be the proximate and necessary result of his injury, if any. And if you believe from the evidence that the defendant, not in the necessary or to him apparently necessary defense of himself or his home, as supposed to you in Instruction No. II, wantonly and maliciously assaulted and shot the plaintiff, you may award the plaintiff punitive damages, but the entire amount that you may allow to the plaintiff shall not exceed the sum of $10,563.00, the amount claimed in the petition."
The argument in support of the defense pleaded in paragraph 2 of the answer and of instruction No. 2 given by the court may be summarized as follows:
However, the facts pleaded and proved are admissible for another purpose. It was the rule at common law that the defendant could not give in evidence in mitigation of damages the acts or declarations of the plaintiff at a different time, or any antecedent acts which were not fairly to be considered a part of one and the same transaction, though they may have been ever so irritating or provoking. Recognizing the harshness of this rule, the Legislature in the year 1906 enacted what is now section 73a-1, Kentucky Statutes, reading as follows: "In all civil actions for damages inflicted by an assault, or by an assault and battery, the defendant shall have the right to plead as a defense to the claim for punitive damages, and to introduce in evidence in mitigation of damages, any matter of provocation which preceded the assault or assault and battery. If the matter of provocation prompted the assault or assault and battery, and was of a nature as to cause a person of ordinary prudence and judgment to take the action taken by the defendant."
The statute has been construed in several cases, and it uniformly has been held that matters of provocation preceding the assault and battery may be pleaded and proved in mitigation of punitive damages, but not of compensatory damages. We think the provocation relied on by Howard falls within the statute, and could be proved in mitigation of punitive damages.
Though pleaded and sought in the petition, the court did not authorize a finding for reasonable medical and hospital bills incurred. It is insisted that this was proper, because the bills were paid by
There is no substantial evidence in the record that
On the return of the case the court will instruct the jury as follows:
"1. You will find for plaintiff and award him such sum in damages as you may believe from the evidence will fairly compensate him for his reasonable hospital and medical bills, if any, not exceeding the sum of $153.00; for his mental and physical suffering, if any, directly resulting from the injuries inflicted by defendant, and for the temporary impairment, if any, of his power to earn money directly resulting from his injuries during such time as you may believe from the evidence such impairment, if any, has continued, but not exceeding in all the sum of $10,153.00, the amount claimed in the petition."
"2. If you believe that defendant wantonly and maliciously shot and wounded and injured plaintiff, you may in addition to compensatory damages award plaintiff punitive damages, not exceeding in all the sum of $10,000.00. If, however, you believe from the evidence that plaintiff gave to the defendant such provocation to assault and injure plaintiff as would cause an ordinarily prudent man under like or similar circumstances so to assault and injure plaintiff, and that such provocation, if any, did prompt defendant to assault and injure plaintiff, you may consider such provocation, if any, in mitigation of the punitive damages, if any, which you may find for plaintiff."
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial consistent with this opinion.
No comments:
Post a Comment